As per a recent survey conducted by Rick Fawn, Karolina Kluczewska, and Oleg Korneev, the European Union's actions in Central Asia are generally perceived as those of a donor, primarily through its funding of NGOs, and a benevolent actor that poses little to no threat to the interests of the region compared to other partners like China and Russia. The EU seems content with this perception and frequently echoes it in its public discourse. For instance, in July 2019, the EU High Representative emphasized at the first EU-Central Asia Forum that the EU is "not here for geopolitical interests or games," preferring instead to prioritize governance improvement, human rights, and other concepts that fall outside its immediate and short-term interests. The EU also claims to be open to dialogue, further enhancing its image as a partner that is primarily focused on promoting regional stability and development.

As a result, many states in Central Asia are inclined to engage in mutually beneficial trade relations with the EU but remain wary of the EU's involvement in their national governance. Gian Marco Moisé and Paolo Sorbello remind us that the EU is not a monolithic entity; its member states and transnational companies often have their own interests and agendas, which can result in contradictions between stated intentions and actions. For instance, while the EU promotes the principle of fair and open markets, the lack of competition among transnational corporations (TNCs) exploiting the region's oil resources directly clashes with this principle. Likewise, the EU's emphasis on human rights and democratic values is contradicted by allegations of ENI's involvement in the abduction of the wife and daughter of a prominent opponent of Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev in Rome in 2013. Within the oil and gas industry, TNCs and Central Asian governments tend to prefer bilateral engagement over-relying on existing diplomatic networks. This approach benefits private shareholders and local elites and allows for greater flexibility in considering various options for deals, including competition from other countries like Russia or China. In essence, this non-exclusive approach enables both parties to explore opportunities that best suit their interests without being tied to a specific partner.

One area where the European Union stands out from other actors in the Central Asian region is in its approach to the societal sphere. In the 2007 Central Asia EU Strategy, the EU placed significant emphasis on the importance of promoting the rule of law, supporting civil society, and ensuring human rights, which were seen as essential components of security during the German EU presidency at that time. This emphasis on societal issues demonstrates the EU's commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, and good governance in the region, which sets it apart from other actors who may prioritize economic or geopolitical interests.

Rick Fawn, Karolina Kluczewska & Oleg Korneev, as well as Sureyya Yigit, challenge the assumption underlying the EU's priorities in Central Asia, namely that there is a widespread desire for more liberal interventions in domestic governance matters. Yigit even suggests that recent events in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have led to a growing conservatism among the nascent middle class and that it may be wise to affirm the center's stabilizing effect to prevent anarchist tendencies. In response to these developments, the EU's latest 2019 document on the Central Asia strategy is more attuned to the needs of the region and prioritizes the construction of an equal partnership as an end in itself. This approach acknowledges the importance of respecting Central Asian sovereignty and tailoring interventions to the specific needs and preferences of each country.

Fabienne Bossuyt's critique of the EU's approach in Central Asia is that it remains too neoliberal and Eurocentric, with global templates applied to the region regardless of its unique context. Similarly, Rick Fawn, Karolina Kluczewska & Oleg Korneev suggest that EU-funded NGOs often feel like mere implementers of pre-determined EU templates. To address these concerns, Bossuyt and Yigit propose that the EU adopt strategies that are more flexible and capable of integrating with pre-existing structures, such as the mahallas in Uzbekistan or aksakals. They also suggest that the concept of resilience be reconceptualized as a form of self-governance based on a deep understanding of the local meaning of the "good life" concept. By engaging with these informal structures critically, the EU can help to limit their negative aspects, such as their potential exploitation for electoral purposes or their reinforcement of patrimonial and patriarchal values.

The EU's engagement in the political field of Central Asia aims to promote regionalism that is similar to the EU model, while also recognizing and supporting bilateral arrangements (Is this a citation or comment? If citation, give a source). ‘The EU has a strong interest in seeing Central Asia develop as a region of rules-based cooperation and connectivity rather than of competition and rivalry’, as stated by the High Representative in 2019 (Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU and Central Asia). Additionally, the EU also engages in bilateral formats with each Central Asian country, evident in several Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.

Ultimately, even if the EU allegedly refuses to engage in a “geopolitical game”, its actions in Central Asia are often perceived as such by competing powers in the region. Despite this, the EU appears to be lagging behind its rivals, such as China, Russia, and the United States, in terms of its level of involvement in trade, transportation infrastructure, and educational initiatives such as scholarships and universities.

Scholars seem to agree that the EU's emphasis on promoting the rule of law, supporting civil society, and ensuring human rights has been well-received by some in the region, but there are concerns about the applicability of EU templates to the specificities of Central Asia, and about contradictions between EU rhetoric and the actions of member-states and their TNCs. Additionally, while the EU's approach is often seen as less threatening than that of other actors in the region, the tendency to ignore and replace existing structures and systems instead of relying on them could interfere with the completion of the EU's alleged objectives. Overall, it seems that the EU's actions in Central Asia are seen as positive, but there is room for improvement and a need to address these concerns in order to achieve the Union's objectives in the region.

Works cited:

• Bossuyt, F., & Davletova, N. (2022). Communal self-governance as an alternative to neoliberal governance: proposing a post-development approach to EU resilience-building in Central Asia. Central Asian Survey, 41(4), 788–807. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2022.2058913
• Fawn, R. (2021). ‘Not here for geopolitical interests or games’: the EU’s 2019 strategy and the regional and inter-regional competition for Central Asia. Central Asian Survey, 41(4), 675–698. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1951662
• Fawn, R., Kluczewska, K., & Korneev, O. (2022). EU–Central Asian interactions: perceptions, interests and practices. Central Asian Survey, 41(4), 617–638. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2022.2134300
• Moisé, G. M., & Sorbello, P. (2022). The EU and European transnational companies in Central Asia: relocating agency in the energy sector. Central Asian Survey, 41(4), 770–787. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2022.2049590
• Yigit, S. (2022). EU - Central Asian Civil Societal Relations: Unrealistic Expectations, Discouraging Results. Cuadernos Europeos De Deusto, 05, 149–204. https://doi.org/10.18543/ced.2558

Other sources:

• Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership, May 15. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_-_the_eu_and_central_asia_-_new_opportunities_for_a_stronger_partnership.pdf .